In
2014, the U.S. Supreme Court presided over the case McCullen v. Coakley. The case concerned a
Massachusetts statute, the Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act from 2000
and 2007, which “makes it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within
thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility violates the First
Amendment” (SCOTUSblog). Eleanor McCullen and other activists, the petitioners,
engage in what is considered “sidewalk counseling,” which includes suggesting
alternatives in a calm manner to women entering the clinic in order to refrain
from an abortion.
In 2008, the petitioners sued Martha Coakley, the
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusets, on grounds of the statute
being violative of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They first sued in
District Court, which ruled in favor of Coakley. The petitioners then appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the First District, which upheld “the 2007 version
as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulation under the test set forth
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781
(1989)” (McCullen v. Coakley). Subsequently, they appealed to the
Supreme Court with a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court decided to grant
certiorari and review the case during the 2014 term.
On
June 26th, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the
Massachusetts statute with its buffer zones is indeed violative of the First
Amendment and that it thus infringes on the right to free speech, since the
petitioners’ attempts would be thwarted (McCullen v. Coakley). Chief Justice
Roberts delivered the majority opinion, in which many issues, such as content
and strict scrutiny are considered. The majority opinion itself holds that the
buffer zones restrict the petitioners’ free speech as well as the possibility
of practicing compassionate sidewalk counseling (since the distance prevents
them from “personal, caring, and consensual conversations”): thus, “the buffer
zones burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the Commonwealth’s
asserted interests” (McCullen v. Coakley). Therefore, the Commonwealth has insufficiently
studied approaches that would be less restrictive and would not exclude
“individuals from areas historically open for speech and debate” (McCullen v.
Coakley). Thus, it violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reverses the
Court of Appeals’ ruling and the case is remanded.
Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas concur by arguing that the “obvious purpose of the
challenged portion of the Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act
is to “protect” prospective clients of abortion clinics from having to hear abortion-opposing
speech on public streets and sidewalks,” which they perceive to be
unconstitutional (McCullen v. Coakley). The majority and this opinion differ on
the topic of content-neutrality as well. Justice Alito concurs as well in
another separate opinion while arguing that the act discriminates based on
viewpoint.
Relevant
to this case is a precedent named Hill v. Colorado from 2000, which upheld
anti-abortion buffer zones, since that law was narrowly tailored. As Kevin
Russell asks, could the reasons explicated for overturning the Massachusetts
statute also serve to deem Colorado’s buffer zones unconstitutional? The
McCullen decision thus evokes new questions and issues which could severely
impact other statutes and legislation. In fact, three concurring Justices advocated
the overturn of Hill (McCullen; Denniston).
Ultimately,
the Supreme Court did uphold free speech in the McCullen v. Coakley case with a 9-0 vote,
which is a victory for freedom of speech
in the United States. While I advocate unlimited freedom of speech and thus
fully agree with this decision and deem it justified, I do wish more people would
respect each others’ privacy and sorrow.Even though the petitioners do not
assault the women they approach, are caring in their conversations, and respect
the final choice the approached woman makes, which I all appreciate, I do find
it saddening that fragile women, who are in pain over the decision they are
about to make and may be traumatized by that same decision, have to defend
themselves and justify their choices on such a tragic and difficult day. On the
other hand, however, precisely that, the freedom to be hurtful, is essential to
the exercise of freedom of speech, which, in my view, should always be
preserved, since it should be a right available to all people, fosters debate
and critical thinking, and may lead to change for the better in many instances.
Steven
Shapiro, affiliated with the American Civil, clearly reflects the dilemma I
have found myself entangled in as well: “This is a hard case and the
majority opinion reflects the difficulty and importance of balancing two
constitutional rights: the right of women to enter and leave abortion clinics
free from the harassment, intimidation, and violence they have too often
suffered in the past; and the right of peaceful protestors to express their
opposition to abortion on the public streets outside abortion clinics.”
A photo of petitioner Eleanor McCullen (Loeb).
Works
Cited
Denniston,
Lyle. “Opinion Analysis: A Broader Right to Oppose Abortion.” SCOTUSblog:
Supreme Court of the United States Blog. Bloomberg Law, 26 June
2014. Web. 16 September 2014.
Loeb,
Saul. Eleanor McCullen, who challenged
Massachusetts' 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics, stands outside the Supreme Court building
on Jan. 15, 2014. AFP. Photograph. 17
September 2014.
“McCullen
v. Coakley.” SCOTUSblog: Supreme Court of the United States Blog. Bloomberg Law, n.d. Web.
16 September 2014.
McCullen
v. Coakley. 573 U.S. Supreme Court of the United States. 2014. Cornell
University Law School Legal Information
Institute. Web. 15 September 2014.
Shapiro,
Steven R. “ACLU Reacts to Supreme Court Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Ruling.” American
Civil Liberties Union. 26 June 2014. Web. 16 September 2014.
Russell,
Kevin. “What is Left of Hill v. Colorado?” SCOTUSblog: Supreme Court of the United
States Blog. Bloomberg Law, 26 June 2014. Web. 16
September 2014.